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1
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a) (“There shall be exempt from forced sale . . . the
following property owned by a natural person: (1) a homestead . . . ”).
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Mr. and Mrs. Smith are Florida residents who have owned
their home for two years. Both of them have been trying hard to
make ends meet, but bills have been mounting since Mr. Smith
got laid off and their daughter needed physical therapy not
covered by insurance. Sick of having to take the phone off the
hook to avoid the debt collectors’ incessant calls, Mr. Smith
decides that it might be time to file for bankruptcy. He performs
a quick Google search on Florida bankruptcy law and realizes
that under the Florida Constitution, the homestead is exempt
from a forced sale if it is owned by a “natural person.”1 Still
feeling uneasy because the bills and deed to the home are in his
name, he decides to transfer the property to his wife to make
sure it is safe from creditors. He reasons that if the house would
be exempt from a forced sale after he files for bankruptcy there is
no harm in transferring it early to avoid premature claims by
overeager creditors. Anxious about the prospect of creditors
trying to take his home, he has his lawyer draw up a deed
transferring the home to his wife for twenty dollars in
consideration.
Six months later, he files for bankruptcy.
Immediately after his first court appearance, the court-appointed
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Id.
See Kapila v. Fornabaio (In re Fornabaio), 187 B.R. 780, 782–83 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1995); see also Malone v. Short (In re Short), 188 B.R. 857, 860 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1995).
4
In re Fornabaio, 187 B.R. at 782.
5
See Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that a
majority of courts have rejected the “no harm, no foul” approach).
6
11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
7
See, e.g., Tavenner, 257 F.3d at 407–08; Lasich v. Wickstrom (In re
Wickstrom), 113 B.R. 339, 351, 352 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990).
8
Tavenner, 257 F.3d at 407.
9
See, e.g., id.
10
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (citing Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918)).
3
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trustee overseeing the estate files suit against Mrs. Smith to
recover the property her husband transferred to her alleging it
was fraudulently transferred. What result to Mr. Smith?
The plain language of the Florida statute seems
straightforward: The trustee would not be able to avoid Mr.
Smith’s transfer of his homestead which occurred prior to his
petition for bankruptcy because the property is exempt under
Florida state law.2 The United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Florida decided accordingly, analyzing these
types of transfers under a “no harm, no foul” approach.3 Under
this reasoning, if the creditor is not harmed by the pre-petition
transfer of property otherwise exempt from the bankruptcy
estate under state law, the pre-petition transfer cannot be
avoided.4 However, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Florida is in the minority regarding decisions on this
issue.5 The majority of federal courts have held that under § 548
of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),6 a trustee can avoid a debtor’s
pre-petition transfer of property, regardless of whether the
property would have been otherwise exempt under applicable
state laws, because such a transfer constitutes a “fraudulent
conveyance.”7 This reasoning stems from the notion that all
property is part of the bankruptcy estate until the debtor claims
an exemption.8 Thus, allowing pre-petition transfers could harm
creditors because it is never definite that a debtor will claim an
available exemption.9
The core principles of federal bankruptcy law, codified in the
Bankruptcy Code, are twofold: (1) to ensure maximum and
equitable distribution of the debtor’s assets among creditors and
(2) to give the debtor a fresh start.10 The fraudulent conveyance11
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11
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (allowing a trustee to avoid a transfer by a debtor made
with actual or constructive fraudulent intent).
12
Id. § 547(b)(1) (allowing a trustee to avoid a transfer by a debtor that gives
preference to one creditor over another). Many of the cases cited in this Note analyze
the “no harm, no foul” approach under both § 547 and § 548. In this Note, however,
only § 548 is analyzed, although both provisions are treated the same for purposes of
the “no harm, no foul” framework. See In re Wickstrom, 113 B.R. at 351 (“[N]o
distinction should be drawn based upon whether the trustee asserts a preferential
transfer or a fraudulent conveyance has taken place.”).
13
Id. § 522; see also Dana Yankowitz, Comment, “I Could Have Exempted It
Anyway”: Can a Trustee Avoid a Debtor’s Prepetition Transfer of Exemptible
Property?, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 217, 218 (2006).
14
See id. § 522(g); cf. Lockwood v. Exch. Bank of Fort Valley, 190 U.S. 294, 299
(1903) (holding that the bankruptcy estate never succeeded to the debtor’s exempt
property).
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and preferential treatment12 provisions of the Code help achieve
the first goal by protecting creditors’ claims to the bankruptcy
estate. The Code furthers the fresh start goal by allowing the
debtor to protect certain assets from creditors by exempting them
from the bankruptcy estate.13 However, the interests of the
creditor and debtor conflict when determining whether a debtor
should be permitted to transfer otherwise exempt property prior
to his petition for bankruptcy. On one hand, courts could protect
the rights of the creditor by deeming all pre-petition transfers of
assets “fraudulent” regardless of their status as exempt under
state law. Alternatively, courts could aim to protect the debtor’s
right to a fresh start by determining that unless a creditor’s
financial interests are harmed, the transfer cannot constitute a
“fraudulent conveyance” if the assets would be exempt under
state law.
This Note sides with the “no harm, no foul” approach in this
debate, arguing that bankruptcy courts should not avoid prepetition transfers of otherwise exempt property under § 548
simply because an exemption was not actually taken and the
transfer was instead the alternative path used to shield the
property from collection. Part I of this Note explains the
constructive fraud and exemption provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, including state opt-out provisions which are particularly
applicable to this issue. Part I also discusses the legislative
history of federal bankruptcy law with particular focus on the
creation of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, which altered the
definition of the bankruptcy estate.14
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Part II addresses the split of authority among the United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals as to whether a trustee can
avoid a pre-petition transfer of otherwise exempt property. Part
III argues that the minority “no harm, no foul” approach is the
best approach for courts to take when analyzing pre-petition
transfers of exempt property under the Bankruptcy Code. On the
basis of this argument, Part IV recommends amending
§ 548(a)(1) to reflect the “no harm, no foul” approach.
I.

STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The Bankruptcy Code aims to protect creditors’ interests in
the debtor’s bankruptcy estate by allowing a trustee to avoid
certain transfers of property.15 This system serves as a safeguard
against other provisions of the Code that allow the debtor to
protect certain assets from the reach of creditors during
bankruptcy proceedings.16 These opposing goals serve as the
main source of conflict for the differing views of courts regarding
a debtor’s pre-petition transfer of exempt property.17
A.

Statutory Provisions

1.

Fraudulent Conveyances

The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . of an interest of the
debtor in property, or any obligation . . . incurred by the debtor,
that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date
of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily—
15

11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).
Id. §§ 522(b)(2), 544(b)(1).
17
See infra Part II; see also 11 U.S.C. § 547 (preferential transfers); id. § 548
(exemption provisions).
18
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).
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Many debtors facing bankruptcy seek to transfer assets to a
third party to keep property out of the reach of creditors. One
way debtors seek to accomplish this goal is by having the third
party transfer the asset back to the debtor after bankruptcy
proceedings have concluded, which allows the debtor to escape
the consequences of bankruptcy scot-free. The starting point for
a trustee to avoid such a transfer by a debtor is
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1), the fraudulent conveyance provision.18
Section 548(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:

16
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(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the
debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer
was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of
such transfer or obligation . . . .19

Thus, under § 548(a)(1)(A), a trustee can avoid any transfer
by a debtor which was transferred with the “actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors within two years of filing for
bankruptcy.20 Section 548(a)(1)(B) allows a trustee to avoid
constructively fraudulent transfers in which a debtor’s exchange
of property was for less than a reasonably equivalent value and
made while the debtor was either insolvent or rendered insolvent
by the transfer.21
Under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), a bankruptcy trustee has whatever
avoiding powers an unsecured creditor with an allowable claim
might have under applicable state or federal law.22 Courts have
interpreted § 544(b) as allowing a trustee to use applicable state
law to avoid a transfer as fraudulent under the federal
Bankruptcy Code.23 Most states have adopted the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, which has now been renamed the

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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19
Id. Note that § 548(a)(1)(A) refers to actual fraud, while § 548(a)(1)(B) refers
to constructive fraud. Id.
20
Id. § 548(a)(1)(A).
21
Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii)(I). The statute also avoids constructively fraudulent
transfers if the debtor’s exchange of property was less than a reasonably equivalent
value and made while the debtor intended to become insolvent by the transfer or if a
debtor was left with unreasonably small capital by a transfer pursuant to a debtor’s
engagement in a business transaction. Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii)(II), (ii)(III).
22
Id. § 544(b)(1).
23
Malone v. Short (In re Short), 188 B.R. 857, 859 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
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Uniform Voidable Transaction Act24 (“UVTA”), which will govern
a trustee’s power to avoid a transfer as fraudulent under
§ 544(b). The UVTA has similar avoidance language to § 548.25
2.

Exemptions

The Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to exempt certain
assets from the bankruptcy estate. Section 522 allows the debtor
to exempt property which could be exempted under applicable
state law.26 Most states have specified exemptions for debtors
under state law—most notably, the homestead exemption.27
Additionally, although the Code allows the debtor to choose
between exemptions under federal or state law, most states
require a debtor to use applicable state law when exempting
However, the Bankruptcy Code does limit the
property.28
exemptions which can be taken by a debtor. Under § 522, a
debtor’s aggregate interest in exempt property cannot exceed
$22,975.29
The exemption provisions of the Bankruptcy Code promote
important interests of bankruptcy law. They give the debtor a
safety net and further the goal of allowing the debtor a “fresh
start” after filing for bankruptcy.30 These provisions ensure that

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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24
To date, forty-three states and the District of Columbia have adopted the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”)—which has now been renamed the
Uniform Voidable Transactions Act and includes some changes from the UFTA—in
state legislation. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Fraudulent Transfer Act—Now Known
as
Voidable
Transactions
Act,
UNIFORM
LAW
COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Fraudulent%20Transfe
r%20Act%20-%20now%20known%20as%20Voidable%20Transactions%20Act
(last
visited Jan. 26, 2015).
25
See Uniform Voidable Transactions Act § 4(a) (2014). The UVTA provides
“badges of fraud” to determine whether a conveyance by a debtor is voidable by a
creditor. Id. § 4(b)(2) (listing factors that the official comments to § 4 refer to as
“badges of fraud”). Note that the newly adopted UVTA has changed the language of
the UFTA, which referred to fraudulent transfers instead of voidable transactions.
See Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(a) (1985).
26
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2).
27
See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1) (Florida homestead exemption); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 20:1 (2015) (Louisiana homestead exemption); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 188, § 1 (2015) (Massachusetts homestead exemption).
28
See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 123 (1997).
29
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).
30
See Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918).
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a debtor and his family are not destitute following proceedings
and have some way of rejoining normal economic society in the
future.31
3.

Debtor’s Bankruptcy Estate

The language of 11 U.S.C. § 541 defines the property which
constitutes the debtor’s estate at the commencement of a
bankruptcy proceeding.32 This language provides the source of
conflict which has divided the circuit courts on the issue of
whether a pre-petition transfer of otherwise exempt property can
be avoided by a trustee as a fraudulent transfer. Section 541
provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he commencement of a
case . . . creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of . . . all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.”33
This section provides that the debtor’s bankruptcy estate is
comprised of all the debtor’s interests in property at the
commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings.34 As discussed in
Part II, the courts place a great deal of emphasis on this
provision of the Code when determining whether a conveyance is
fraudulent under § 548(a)(1). The classification of a debtor’s prepetition transfer of property will turn largely on whether courts
read § 541 as prohibiting debtors from transferring property
until after they file for bankruptcy, including property otherwise
exempt from creditors under state law.
Legislative History

The treatment of a debtor’s exempt property
continuously evolved under federal bankruptcy laws since
introduction of the Bankruptcy Act in 1898. Congress
amended the language of the bankruptcy laws to reflect
changing characterization of the bankruptcy estate, and it
instituted limitations on state-established exemptions for
debtor.35 The history of federal bankruptcy law illustrates

31

has
the
has
the
has
the
the
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See id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 541.
33
Id. § 541(a)(1).
34
Id.
35
See Posner, supra note 28, at 100–01 (discussing how the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 created a minimum floor for federal exemptions, allowing debtors to
choose between state exemptions and federal exemptions).
32
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source of federal courts’ divergent views on the treatment of a
debtor’s pre-petition transfer of property and on the role of state
law in determining a debtor’s fate.
1.

Bankruptcy Act of 1898

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (“1898 Act”) explicitly
incorporated state exemption allowances.36 Under the 1898 Act,
the bankruptcy estate never succeeded to the debtor’s exempt
property.37 Additionally, the 1898 Act disallowed characterizing
a debtor’s transfer as fraudulent if state law exempted the
property from the debtor’s estate.38 Later amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act made this result more apparent by defining
property of a debtor that could be fraudulently conveyed as
inclusive of only his nonexempt property.39
State exemption laws varied greatly at the time the 1898 Act
was in effect.40 The lack of consistency led to a call for the
creation of a uniform system of exemptions.41 However, federal
and state interests divided sharply over exemption policy because
the states historically controlled this realm of bankruptcy law.42
Federal bankruptcy law continued to incorporate state
exemptions immediately preceding the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197843 (“1978 Reform Act”). Federal
exemptions did exist, but while they supplanted many state
exemptions, “the federal exemptions did not play a significant
role in bankruptcy cases.”44
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See id. at 63.
See id.
38
See Yankowitz, supra note 13, at 224–25. Property fraudulently conveyed by a
bankrupt debtor “shall . . . be and remain a part of the assets and estate of the
bankrupt” but only if “the same is not exempt from execution and liability for debts
by the law of his domicile.” Id. at 225 (quoting Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541,
§ 67(e), 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978)).
39
See G. Stanley Joslin, Insolvency in Bankruptcy: A Synthesis, 38 IND. L.J. 23,
26 (1962).
40
Posner, supra note 28, at 63 (“Many exemption statutes were archaic, singling
out bibles, guns, crops, or farm animals. They reflected the rural origins of states
that had since become highly urbanized. Some allowed debtors to waive the
exemptions in a contract, others did not. Some allowed debtors to avoid liens, others
did not.”).
41
Id.
42
Id. at 94–95.
43
Id. at 95.
44
Id.
37
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The 1978 Reform Act marked a significant effort by Congress
to establish a more uniform set of exemption laws for bankruptcy
proceedings brought under federal law.45 This Act created what
is considered the modern-day Bankruptcy Code. However,
Congress’s attempt did not fully solve the problem, and the
House Bill that was eventually passed established a set of federal
exemptions but gave the debtor the right to choose between
The federal exemptions
federal and state exemptions.46
essentially provided a “floor” for debtors—they included a
$10,000 dollar exemption limit for the homestead and a $5,000
exemption limit for miscellaneous personal property.47 With the
passage of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress in effect ceded to state
power and “franchis[ed] exemption policy to the states.”48
b.

Treatment of the Debtor’s Estate Under § 541(a)(1)

45

C M
Y K
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See id. at 99–101.
Id.; see also 11 U.S.C.§ 522 (2012).
47
Posner, supra note 28, at 100–01.
48
Id. at 108. Congress’s retreat from uniformity and its institution of a floor
may have been a result, in part, of the influence of state officials. See id. at 105.
Additionally, state governments are perceived to have more information about local
interests than the federal government, which allows the states to satisfy local
interests more successfully through tailored exemption laws. Id. at 105–06.
49
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
50
See Lasich v. Wickstrom (In re Wickstrom), 113 B.R. 339, 350 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1990).
46
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Although the 1978 Reform Act left exemption law in the
hands of the states, it altered judicial treatment of state
exemption law through other changes. The primary example of
this alteration can be seen in the language of § 541(a)(1)
following the 1978 revisions. Under the newly established
Bankruptcy Code, the debtor’s bankruptcy estate succeeds to “all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.”49 Thus, § 541(a)(1) has the effect of
overruling case law interpreting the 1898 Act.50 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the 1898 Act as explicitly excluding
property exempted under state law from the debtor’s assets in a
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bankruptcy proceeding.51 Under the 1978 Reform Act, however,
property of the estate includes “all property of the debtor, even
that needed for a fresh start.”52
The enactment of § 541(a)(1) marks the point of controversy
that fuels the current circuit split over pre-petition transfers of
exempt property. Although § 522(b) allows a debtor to elect the
use of state exemption law, § 541(a)(1) defines the debtor’s estate
as all interests of the debtor in property. It is difficult to
determine how these provisions coincide and the ultimate effect
this has on fraudulent conveyances under § 548(a)(1). For
example, § 522 allows a debtor to opt out of the federal exemption
scheme and elect to use state law exemptions. This allowance
implies that pre-petition transfers of property cannot be
considered fraudulent conveyances if they are allowed under the
state law that applies to the debtor.53 However, § 541 and
§ 548(a)(1), when read alone, seem to bar pre-petition transfers.
Section 541 states that a debtor’s bankruptcy estate consists of
all interests of the debtor in property,54 and § 548(a)(1) allows a
trustee to avoid “any transfer . . . of an interest of the debtor in
property.”55 This reading appears to give the bankruptcy court
jurisdiction over a debtor’s exempt property and to allow
pre-petition transfers to be avoided as fraudulent.56
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT

51
52
53

55
56

04/08/2016 13:04:55

54

Lockwood v. Exch. Bank of Fort Valley, 190 U.S. 294, 299 (1903).
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 82 (1978).
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1).
See id. § 541(a)(1).
Id. § 548(a)(1).
See id.
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Since the inception of the Bankruptcy Code, circuit courts
have been divided over whether a debtor’s pre-petition transfer of
otherwise exempt property constitutes a fraudulent conveyance
under § 548. The majority of courts have held that a trustee can
avoid such a transfer under § 548(a)(1). However, a minority of
courts have applied the “no harm, no foul” doctrine and have
refused to let a trustee avoid a pre-petition transfer if the
property would be exempt under applicable state law.
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Majority Position: The Wickstrom Approach

The majority of circuit courts have held that a trustee can
avoid a debtor’s pre-petition transfer of potentially exempt
property under the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”).
This
determination is based on two main arguments: (1) The “no
harm, no foul” approach to § 548 is misguided, and (2) language
in the Bankruptcy Code would be rendered superfluous by the
adoption of the “no harm, no foul” approach.57
1.

“No Harm, No Foul” Rejected

C M
Y K
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57
See Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 406–07 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding the
majority approach for two reasons: “§ 522(g) of the Bankruptcy Code apparently
anticipates this result . . . [and] the ‘no harm, no foul’ approach is misguided”).
58
See, e.g., id. at 407.
59
See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (“[An] estate is comprised of . . . all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”); see also
Tavenner, 257 F.3d at 407.
60
See, e.g., Tavenner, 257 F.3d at 407.
61
113 B.R. 339 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990).
62
Id. at 341–42.
63
Id. at 340 (noting that the trustee also sought to recover the transfers as
preferential transfers under § 547(b)).
64
Id. at 346.
65
Id. at 346–47.
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The majority of circuits disagree with the “no harm, no foul”
approach because they believe that the minority of courts
prematurely dismiss the interests of the creditor in state-law
exempt property.58 According to the majority, all property, even
potentially exempt property, is part of the bankruptcy estate
reachable by creditors under § 541 until the debtor claims an
exemption.59 Thus, the majority of circuit courts believes that “no
harm, no foul” is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.60
For example, in the seminal case of Lasich v. Wickstrom,61
the debtor transferred real property and money to his parents
and son approximately three months before he filed for
bankruptcy.62 The trustee of the debtor’s estate sought to recover
the transfers as a fraudulent conveyance under § 548(a).63 The
transferees contended that the transferred property was exempt
under state law, and therefore the creditors could not be harmed
The court acknowledged the divergent
by the transfers.64
decisions by courts on pre-petition transfers of potentially exempt
property under the Code.65 However, the court refused to adopt
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the “no harm, no foul” approach.66 It stated that a transfer must
be analyzed “in accordance with what happened” and not on the
hypothetical assertion that the creditors would not have been
have been able to reach the exempt property.67 The court
concluded that “ ‘no harm, no foul’ . . . seem[s] to ignore the
possible rights that creditors have in potentially exempt
property.”68
Courts following the Wickstrom approach seek to protect the
creditor’s interest in potentially exempt property based on the
argument that a debtor’s actions can never be determined with
complete certainty. In other words, a court cannot predict which
property a debtor will exempt.69 For example, in Tavenner v.
Smoot,70 the debtor received a settlement from his employer for a
work-related injury under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act.71
The debtor transferred the settlement into an account held by a
corporation of which his wife and children were the sole
shareholders.72 He filed for bankruptcy several months later and
claimed an exemption for the settlement money he had
transferred.73 The trustee sought to avoid the debtor’s transfer of
the settlement funds as fraudulent.74
The Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the “no harm, no foul”
The court
approach based on its “misguided” nature.75
summarized its view of the flawed reasoning behind the minority
approach:

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

75
76

Id. at 352.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 348.
See id. at 346.
257 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 404–05.
Id.
Id. at 405.
Id.
Id. at 407.
Id.
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Under a statutory scheme in which all property is presumed to
be part of the bankruptcy estate, and no property is exempt
until such time as the debtor claims an exemption for it,
creditors can be harmed by transfers of potentially exempt
property because it is not a foregone conclusion that such
property will be exempt from the estate. Potentially exempt
property can be used to satisfy the demands of the creditors if
the debtor never claims the exemption.76
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
agreed with the Wickstrom court’s rejection of “no harm, no foul”
based on the potential rights of creditors.77 Additionally, the
court noted that § 548 did not require that a fraudulent
conveyance cause actual harm to a creditor, nor does § 548
exclude transfers of exempt property from its scope.78
Lastly, the debtor in Sullivan v. Welsh79 transferred her
homestead to her parents less than one year before she filed for
bankruptcy.80 The trustee sought to avoid the transfer as a
fraudulent conveyance under § 548(a).81 The bankruptcy court
held that because the homestead was exempt under state law, it
was not capable of being fraudulently transferred, and therefore
its transfer could not be avoided under the applicable state law.82
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
rejected the lower court’s argument, and the “no harm, no foul”
approach completely, in favor of the Wickstrom approach.83 The
court held that “while state law determines the nature of a
debtor’s interest in property, it does not determine whether a
transfer of that interest is fraudulent under § 548.”84
Accordingly, the court held that § 548 does not apply to property
which would have been exempt because this approach is
inconsistent with the structure of the Bankruptcy Code.85
2.

Majority Support for § 522(g)

77
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Id.
Id. (“[F]or if a debtor enters into a transaction with the express purpose of
defrauding his creditors, his behavior should not be excused simply because, despite
the debtor's best efforts, the transaction failed to harm any creditor.”).
79
457 B.R. 748 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011).
80
Id. at 751.
81
Id. at 751–52.
82
Id. at 752.
83
Id. at 754.
84
Id. at 753 (“[I]f the Bankruptcy Court is correct that courts are to look to the
same state fraudulent transfer law under § 548 as under § 544, then no purpose
would be served by § 548.”). Thus, a trustee is not limited by applicable state law
under § 548(a), even though the trustee would be limited by the applicable state law
available to an unsecured creditor with an allowable claim under § 544(b). See id.
85
Id. at 754.
78
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Courts following the Wickstrom approach find support in
§ 522(g) of the Bankruptcy Code for their position that a debtor’s
pre-petition transfer of exempt property should be avoidable by a
trustee. Section 522(g) provides:
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Notwithstanding sections 550 and 551 of this title, the debtor
may exempt under subsection (b) of this section property that
the trustee recovers . . . to the extent that the debtor could have
exempted such property under subsection (b) of this section if
such property had not been transferred, if—
(1)(A) such transfer was not a voluntary transfer of such
property by the debtor; and
(B) the debtor did not conceal such property . . . .86

While there is no explicit language in the Code that
voluntary transfers are avoidable, courts that follow the
Wickstrom approach interpret the Code in this way based on
For
Congress’s choice to include involuntary transfers.87
88
example, the court in Tavenner v. Smoot relied upon this
language as an indication that Congress intended for a trustee to
be able to avoid a debtor’s transfer of exempt property.89 The
Tavenner court reasoned that a debtor should be denied an
exemption for property transferred in these cases because
Because
“§ 522(g) . . . apparently anticipates this result.”90
§ 522(g) allows a debtor to exempt property in certain
circumstances, such as in the case of an involuntary transfer, the
majority of courts reasons that Congress purposely decided not to
allow a debtor recourse under the Code for his voluntary prepetition transfer of exempt property.91
B.

Minority Position: “No Harm, No Foul” Under the Treiber
Approach

86
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11 U.S.C. § 522(g) (2012).
See id.; see also Yankowitz, supra note 13, at 232 (“Section 522(g) does not
explicitly state that a trustee can avoid a debtor’s prepetition transfer of exemptible
property. But it provides that the debtor can exempt such recovered property if the
requisite factors are fulfilled under subsection (1). This presupposes that the trustee
can avoid the transfer in the first place.”).
88
257 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2001).
89
Id. at 406–07.
90
Id. at 406.
91
See id. at 406–07; see also In re Gingery, 48 B.R. 1000, 1004 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1985) (“A literal reading of Section 522(g) compels the conclusion that a recovered
asset cannot be exempted if it was transferred voluntarily regardless of whether or
not such transfer was concealed.”).
87
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The minority of courts continue to adhere to the “no harm, no
foul,” or diminution of estate, approach. Under this theory, a
transfer of property that a debtor would have been able to claim
as exempt is not considered fraudulent under § 548. Because the

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 297 Side A

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_POMPEI

2015]

4/6/2016 4:11 PM

“NO HARM, STILL FOUL”

981

debtor would have been able to exempt the property and remove
it from the reach of his creditors, his creditors are no worse off as
a result of the transfer than they would have otherwise been
absent the transfer.92 Thus, the assets the creditor would have
received are not diminished in any capacity.
1.

Background of “No Harm, No Foul”

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
initially addressed the issue of pre-petition transfers of exempt
property in In re Agnew.93 In In re Agnew, a debtor transferred
his interest in his homestead, which he and his wife had both
held as tenants by the entirety, to his wife, and his wife
subsequently sold the home.94 The creditor argued that the court
should deny the debtor discharge because his transfer was made
with the intent to defraud his creditors and to remove the
proceeds from the sale of the property from the reach of his
creditors.95 The Seventh Circuit stated that in order for the court
to deny discharge, the creditor must show that the debtor
transferred property, which reduced the assets available to the
creditor, and that the transfer was made with fraudulent
intent.96 Because state law exempted entire property and
proceeds from its sale from the reach of creditors, the court held
that it was it was impossible to conceive of a logical
reason to hold that a conveyance of property not

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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92
See, e.g., Lee Supply Corp. v. Agnew (In re Agnew), 818 F.2d 1284, 1289–90
(7th Cir. 1987); Kapila v. Fornabaio (In re Fornabaio), 187 B.R. 780, 782–83 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1995); Jarboe v. Treiber (In re Treiber), 92 B.R. 930, 933–34 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1988).
93
See generally In re Agnew, 818 F.2d 1284.
94
Id. at 1286.
95
Id. Note that the debtor brought his claim in this case under
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), which has essentially the same language as the fraudulent
conveyance language in § 548(a). See id. Section 727(a)(2) prohibits the court from
denying a debtor discharge under certain circumstances:
[If] the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor . . . has
transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted
to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed—
(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of the petition . . . .
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2012).
96
In re Agnew, 818 F.2d at 1289.

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 297 Side B

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_POMPEI

982

4/6/2016 4:11 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:967

97

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

Id. at 1289–90.
Id. at 1290.
99
92 B.R. 930 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1988).
100
Id. at 931.
101
Id. at 933–34.
102
Id. at 932.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 934 (“To hold otherwise would simply allow the husband’s creditors to
indirectly, through the trustee, defeat the homestead interests of the wife and family
when they could not do this acting their own.”).
106
Kapila v. Fornabaio (In re Fornabaio), 187 B.R. 780 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995).
107
Id. at 781.
108
Id. Note that this case was also brought under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2). See
discussion supra note 96.
109
In re Fornabaio, 187 B.R. at 782–83.
98
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subject to the claims of creditors could be fraudulent.97
Accordingly, it ruled in favor of the debtor and denied the
creditors’ claims.98
The case which first set forth the “no harm, no foul”
argument is Jarboe v. Treiber99 (“In re Treiber”). In In re Treiber,
a debtor transferred his one-half interest in his homestead
property to his wife within one year of filing for bankruptcy.100
The trustee of the estate attempted to avoid the conveyance, but
the court found in favor of the debtor because the homestead was
exempt under state law.101 The court determined that no creditor
was harmed when the subject of a transfer was potentially
exempt property because the creditors would not share in the
value of the property even if it had not been conveyed.102 “In
short,—no harm, no foul.”103
The Treiber court found that even if the trustee were to avoid
the conveyance, the debtor and his family would still have a
homestead exemption in the property which would be superior to
any rights of the trustee.104 Accordingly, the court would not
allow the creditors to indirectly defeat the homestead interest of
the debtor’s family where they could not do so under state law.105
Similarly, the debtor in In re Fornabaio106 executed a deed
relinquishing his rights to his homestead property in favor of his
wife.107 The trustee sought to avoid the conveyance, asserting
that the debtor transferred the property “with the intent to
hinder, delay or defraud his creditors.”108 The court, while noting
the divergent views on whether exemptible property could be
avoided by a trustee, held in favor of the debtor.109 The court
expressly disagreed with the Wickstrom line of cases which
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allowed for avoidance of transfers of potentially exempt property,
stating, “The Bankruptcy Code was not enacted to penalize
debtors for filing bankruptcy.”110 The court refused to join the
majority of courts because it reasoned it would be penalizing the
debtor for an otherwise legal action under the homestead
exemption laws of the state.111 It instead adopted the Treiber
approach of “no harm, no foul.”112
2.

“No Harm, No Foul” Application to § 548(a)(1)

110
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Id. at 782.
Id. at 782–83.
112
Id. at 782.
113
Because the language of § 548(a) is almost identical to the discharge
language in § 727(a)(1), the earlier “no harm, no foul” decisions involving § 727 are
directly applicable to avoidance actions under § 548. See discussion supra note 96.
114
188 B.R. 857 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
115
Id. at 858.
116
Id.
117
The trustee’s claim under § 544 was that it could avoid transfers avoidable
under applicable law, which the court held included state law. Id. at 858–59. Here,
Florida state law defined a fraudulent transfer as one made with “actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud” a debtor’s creditor. Id. at 859.
118
The trustee’s claim under § 548 referenced § 548(a)(1), the fraudulent
conveyance provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
119
Id. at 858.
111
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Later decisions by courts following the Treiber approach
applied the “no harm, no foul” language to bankruptcy
proceedings brought by trustees under § 548(a)(1) or the
intentional fraudulent conveyance provision of the Bankruptcy
Code.113
In the case of Malone v. Short114 (“In re Short”), a trustee
obtained a judgment in bankruptcy proceedings against the
debtor in state court.115 The debtor subsequently transferred his
joint interest with his wife in his home to sole ownership by his
wife.116 The trustee sought to avoid the debtor’s transfer of his
interest in the property under § 544(b)117 and § 548(a)(1), arguing
that the debtor transferred the property to his wife with the
actual intent to “hinder, delay, or defraud” his creditors.118
However, the debtor claimed that a transfer of homestead
property, which is exempt from the reach of creditors under
Florida state law, could not be made with the intent to defraud
creditors.119 The court agreed with the debtor’s argument,
holding that the transfer could not be avoided under applicable
state law and § 544(b) because Florida law exempts the
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120
Id. at 859–60 (holding that there could be no intent to defraud where
creditors “would have had no claim to the property whether it was transferred or
not”).
121
Id. at 860.
122
See id.
123
275 B.R. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
124
Id. at 192.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 192–93. The trustee argued that this approach was misguided because
the plain language of § 548(a)(1)(A) does not require a showing of the diminution of
the creditor’s resources and because this requirement would “render section
548(a)(1)(B)—the constructive fraud provision—superfluous.” Id. (internal quotation
mark omitted).
127
Id. at 193. The court acknowledged that the trustee’s reading of
§ 548(a)(1)(A) had support in opinions by various courts. Id. (citing Tavenner v.
Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2001)).
128
Id. at 193–96.
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homestead from the claims of creditors, and therefore a
homestead cannot be transferred with the intent to defraud
creditors.120 The court also held that the transfer could not be
avoided under § 548(a)(1) because the property was exempt at
the time of the transfer, and the transfer could not have been
made with the intent to “hinder, delay, or defraud creditors
pursuant to § 548(a)(1).”121 Thus, the court refused to allow the
trustee to avoid the transfer because of the property’s exempt
character under state law in accordance with the Treiber
approach.122
More recently, in Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. v. Gredd,123
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York interpreted the language of § 548(a)(1) in accordance with
the “no harm, no foul” approach.124 The Gredd case involved a
trustee seeking to recover proceeds from a debtor’s sales of
securities within one year of its bankruptcy petition, which the
trustee alleged were “transferred fraudulently” under
§ 548(a)(1)(A).125 The trustee urged the court to reject the “no
harm, no foul” approach put forth by the debtor.126 However, the
court declined to adopt the Wickstrom approach and rejected the
trustee’s request.127
The court based its rejection of the trustee’s reading of
§ 548(a)(1)(A) on both textual interpretation and policy
concerns.128 First, the court relied on the Supreme Court and
Second Circuit Court of Appeals interpretations of “property of
the debtor” under § 547(b) of the Code, which both courts found
to mean “property that would have been part of the estate had it
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not been transferred before the commencement of bankruptcy
proceedings.”129
While this interpretation pertained to the
preferential treatment of creditors under § 547, and not
fraudulent conveyances under § 548, the court “construe[d] this
language to have the same meaning when it is used in
§ 548(a)(1)(A)” based on the rules of statutory construction.130
Thus, for the purposes of § 548(a)(1), the court held that a trustee
could only avoid “an interest of the debtor in property” if the
asset transfer had “actually harmed creditors.”131
Second, the Gredd court reasoned that its requirement that a
fraudulent transfer must actually harm at least one creditor
fulfills the “overarching purpose” of the Bankruptcy Code.132 A
fraudulent transfer that does not make a creditor worse off than
he would have been had the transfer not occurred “obviously does
not offend the policy behind § 548(a)(1)(A).”133 Accordingly, the
court concluded that a creditor must incur actual harm to avoid a
fraudulent transfer under § 548.134 The court also noted that the
transferee bears the initial and ultimate burden of proof to
demonstrate that the transferred assets were never available to
any creditor.135 This ensures that a court’s reading of § 548 is not
overly favorable to the debtor.136
III. “NO HARM, NO FOUL” SHOULD TRUMP
THE WICKSTROM APPROACH
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129
Id. at 193–94 (quoting Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
130
Id. at 194 (stating that identical words in different parts of the same act are
generally understood to have the same meaning absent legislative intent to the
contrary).
131
Id.
132
Id. at 195.
133
Id.
134
Id. Because under federal law these funds were not available to satisfy
obligations by the debtor, the court denied the trustee’s avoidance action. Id. at 198.
135
Id. at 196.
136
Placing the burden on the transferee helps to ensure that the trustee does
not have to face the overwhelmingly difficult task of initially proving its diminution
of estate when seeking to avoid a transfer. Id. Additionally, a transferee will rarely
be successful in making such a showing. See id.
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The “no harm, no foul” doctrine under the Treiber approach
embodies the most logical reading of the Bankruptcy Code when
viewed in its entirety.
The procreditor stance under the
Wickstrom approach in these proceedings represents a valiant
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attempt to ensure that creditors are not harmed by a debtor’s
early transfer. However, the Wickstrom approach is misguided
and overreaching in its interpretation of § 548.137 Based on (1) a
plain language interpretation of the relevant provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, (2) the overarching principles of bankruptcy
law, and (3) the already-high burden placed on the transferee in
pre-petition transfers of exempt property, the Treiber approach
effectively balances the rights of creditors and debtors in
avoidance proceedings while ensuring adherence to both the
actual language and overall purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.138
A.

Plain Language of the Bankruptcy Code

1.

Flaws in the Majority Approach

C M
Y K
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137
The majority reads § 548 independently, instead of viewing it in conjunction
with the other sections of the Bankruptcy Code, namely § 522 and § 544(b). See
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (2012) (allowing for a debtor to opt out of federally-created
exemption rights and use state exemption rights instead); Id. § 544(b)(1) (giving the
trustee whatever avoiding powers an unsecured creditor with an allowable claim
might have under applicable law).
138
See infra Part III.A–C.
139
See supra Part II.A.
140
Pre-petition transfers are not mentioned anywhere in § 548(a)(1). See
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).
141
See infra Part III.A(1)(a)–(b).
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The Wickstrom approach taken by the majority of courts
relies heavily on the language of the Bankruptcy Code (“the
Code”) in reaching the conclusion that pre-petition transfers of
exempt property can be avoided as fraudulent conveyances.139
Courts using the Wickstrom approach are correct in stating that
the Code does not explicitly provide for removing potentially
exempt property from the reach of creditors. However, the
Bankruptcy Code also does not explicitly provide for allowing a
trustee to avoid such pre-petition transfers.140 Much of the
statutory language relied on under the Wickstrom approach only
has implicit meaning, which supports the notion that the
Bankruptcy Code should not allow for the avoidance of these
transfers.141
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Language of § 522(g)

As discussed in Part II.A.1, the court in Tavenner v. Smoot
relied upon § 522(g)(1) of the Code as an indication of Congress’s
definitive intent to treat all transfers of exempt property by a
debtor as avoidable by the trustee.142 However, the court did not
acknowledge the fact that the beginning language of § 522(g)
subjects the trustee to the limitations of § 550 of the Code.
Section 550 of the Code requires the trustee to have
recovered the property under § 548 or another applicable
provision.143 If a debtor’s pre-petition transfer of potentially
exempt property is not fraudulent for the purpose of § 548(a)(1),
the trustee cannot avoid the transfer of property as a fraudulent
conveyance under § 548(a)(1), and § 522(g)(1) would not apply to
Courts that read
the fraudulent conveyance proceeding.144
§ 522(g)(1) as always allowing a trustee to avoid a debtor’s prepetition transfer of exempt property are making an assumption:
Section 548 already characterizes these transfers as
fraudulent.145 This assumption shows the inherent flaw in this
argument taken under the Wickstrom line of cases.
b.

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898

142
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Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 406–07 (4th Cir. 2001).
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 22(g)(1), 550(a) (2012).
144
See id. § 550(a).
145
See id. For a court to reach the conclusion that § 522(g)(1) renders a debtor’s
transfer of exempt property avoidable as a fraudulent conveyance, it is necessary to
determine that the trustee has already recovered the property at issue under § 548.
See id. Without this determination, § 522(g) will never apply to the fraudulent
conveyance proceeding. See id.
146
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); see, e.g., Lasich v. Wickstrom (In re Wickstrom), 113
B.R. 339, 350 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990).
147
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
148
See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing how under the 1898 Act, the trustee never
succeeded to the debtor’s exempt property); see also supra Part I.B.2.b (discussing
the introduction of the § 541(a)(1) language to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code).
143
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Courts following the Wickstrom approach rely primarily on
the language of § 541(a)(1), which defines the bankruptcy estate,
in allowing a trustee to avoid a debtor’s transfer of potentially
exempt property.146 Under § 541(a)(1), the bankruptcy estate is
comprised of “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property.”147 As noted in Part I, this definition marks a change
from the treatment of the estate under the 1898 Act.148 Under
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the Wickstrom approach, many courts rely on this change in
determining that a trustee can avoid transfers of exempt
property.
Courts that have adopted the Wickstrom approach
acknowledge that under the 1898 Act, property exempted from
the bankruptcy estate under state law was unreachable by
creditors.149 However, the courts read § 541(a) as invalidating
that approach because “[a]ll” property becomes part of the
bankruptcy estate.150 Therefore, Wickstrom courts hold that all
property, including potentially exempt property, becomes part of
the bankruptcy estate until the debtor claims an exemption.151 If
the debtor transfers the property prior to filing for bankruptcy,
the debtor loses the ability to claim the property as exempt.152
This argument does not necessarily nullify the entire “no
harm, no foul” approach.153 The language of § 541(a) does bring
all assets of the debtor within the bankruptcy estate,154 which
results in the court having the ability to adjudicate the creditor’s
rights in those assets.155
However, the court’s ability to
adjudicate these rights does not nullify the “no harm, no foul”
approach entirely. Section 541(a)(1) gives the court the ability to
adjudicate parties’ rights with respect to exempt property.156 It
does not bar the court from determining that pre-petition
disposition of exempt property is not fraudulent because it
caused no harm to the creditor.157
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See, e.g., In re Wickstrom, 113 B.R. at 350.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
151
Sullivan v. Welsh (In re Lumbar), 457 B.R. 748, 754 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011);
see also Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 406–07 (4th Cir. 2001).
152
In re Lumbar, 457 B.R. at 754–55.
153
See Nino v. Moyer, 437 B.R. 230, 235 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (holding that while
this particular rationale for “no harm, no foul” is no longer valid, its failure does not
necessarily “nullif[y] established . . . precedent”).
154
See id.
155
Id. at 235–36.
156
See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012).
157
Moyer, 437 B.R. at 236. The Moyer court noted that “no harm, no foul” should
possibly be inapplicable to preferential transfers by a debtor, which could harm the
creditor, but that that rationale is not persuasive for unrelated fraudulent
conveyance proceedings. Id. at 237.
150
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2.

The Treiber Approach Correctly Interprets the Plain
Language of § 548

a.

Compliance with Exemption Statutes Cannot Be Fraudulent
Under § 548(a)(1)

989

158
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11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i)–(B)(ii).
160
Id. § 548(a)(1)(A).
161
Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i)–(B)(ii)(I).
162
See Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2001).
163
Id. The court described transfers between related parties as being “closely
scrutinize[d]” and stated that these transfers create a presumption of actual fraud if
made in the absence of adequate consideration. Id. at 408.
164
Id.
159
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Section 548(a)(1) defines two types of fraud: actual fraud158
and constructive fraud.159 Actual fraud is when a debtor makes a
transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” a
creditor.160 Constructive fraud is, in relevant part, when a debtor
“received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
[a] transfer,” and was “insolvent on the date that such transfer
was made . . . or became insolvent as a result of such transfer.”161
Courts following the Wickstrom approach have determined
that a debtor’s pre-petition transfer can be characterized as
actual fraud as long as the debtor “had the requisite fraudulent
intent.”162 They reason that § 548 does not explicitly require
actual harm to the creditor, so a trustee may avoid any transfer
made by a debtor with the intent to keep the property from the
reach of creditors under § 548(a)(1)(A).163 Transfers between
immediate family members fall into this category and create a
“presumption of fraudulent intent” according to the majority.164
However, this argument has one major flaw: How can a
debtor have the requisite fraudulent intent when he believes he
is transferring property in compliance with state exemption law?
The majority’s attempt at defining actual fraud through the
debtor’s intent adheres to the language of § 548(a)(1)(A) on the
surface, but it ignores the very reason the debtor may be
transferring the property in the first place.
Where state
exemption law prohibits creditors from reaching certain property
and a debtor transfers that property, creditors incur no harm
because they have no rights to the property. Consequently,
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debtors do not act with fraudulent intent because they believe
they have no need to defraud creditors when acting in accordance
with state law.165
Some courts following the “no harm, no foul” approach under
Treiber have recognized this flaw in the Wickstrom approach’s
argument and have disallowed penalization for a debtor’s
If property is exempt under
“otherwise legal action.”166
applicable state law, courts following the Treiber approach have
held that the transfer cannot be avoided as having been made
with the intent to hinder, defraud, or delay a creditor
automatically;167 this is because the debtor cannot possess the
requisite intent if state law exempts the property.168
Furthermore, the constructive fraud provision’s language
cannot be used to avoid a transfer of exempt property if a creditor
has no valid claim. While the Bankruptcy Code does not define
“reasonably equivalent value,” it has been noted that what
constitutes a reasonably equivalent value must be determined
from the view of the debtor’s creditors.169 Thus, unless an
unsecured creditor is made worse off because the debtor received
an amount significantly less than what it paid, no fraudulent
transfer has occurred.170 Under this definition of “reasonably
equivalent value,” a creditor with no rights to a debtor’s exempt
property cannot be logically made worse off by a debtor’s transfer
of the property because they have no stake in exempt property.
If the transfer has no effect on the bankruptcy estate, the
transfer cannot constitute constructive fraud.171
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165
Cf. id. at 407 (“[I]f a debtor enters into a transaction with the express
purpose of defrauding his creditors, his behavior should not be excused simply
because, despite the debtor’s best efforts, the transaction failed to harm any
creditor.”).
166
Kapila v. Fornabaio (In re Fornabaio), 187 B.R. 780, 782–83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1995).
167
Malone v. Short (In re Short), 188 B.R. 857, 860 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
168
See id.
169
Jack F. Williams, Revisiting the Proper Limits of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 8
BANKR. DEV. J. 55, 80 (1951) (“The focus is on the consideration received by the
debtor, not on the value given by the transferee. The purpose of fraudulent transfer
law is the preservation of the debtor’s estate for the benefit of its unsecured
creditors.” (footnote omitted)).
170
Harman v. First Am. Bank of Md. (In re Jeffrey Bigelow Design Grp., Inc.),
956 F.2d 479, 484 (4th Cir. 1992).
171
Id. at 485.
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Interpretation of § 548(a)(1) Under the Treiber Approach
Coincides with Other Provisions of the Code

172
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See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
174
See supra Part II.B.
175
Where state law exempts certain property from the debtor’s bankruptcy
estate, a trustee cannot avoid a transfer of that property under § 548(a)(1) because it
has no valid claim under applicable state law. See Malone v. Short (In re Short), 188
B.R. 857, 859–60 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). If read from the majority view, § 548(a)(1)
would essentially ignore the language of § 544 because it would disregard state law
exemptions in allowing a trustee to avoid such a conveyance. See id.
173
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As discussed in Part I.A, § 544(b)(1) allows for an unsecured
creditor to avoid any interest of a debtor in property that is
voidable under applicable state law.172 However, where state law
incorporates exemptions for a debtor, the statute disallows the
creditor from bringing a claim under § 544(b).173
Despite what seems like protection for state exemption laws
under § 544(b)(1), courts following the Wickstrom approach still
allow a trustee to reach otherwise exempt property under
§ 548(a)(1) solely based on the timing of the transfer. Under the
Wickstrom approach, courts reason that because the debtor
transfers the otherwise exempt property prior to filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor relinquishes all exemption rights in the
property. It is unclear why the Wickstrom courts allow trustees
to circumvent the language of § 544(b)(1) and use § 548(a)(1) as a
method of reaching a debtor’s exempt property. Such a reading
of § 548(a)(1) indicates the majority approach’s tendency to look
at § 548(a)(1) in isolation, instead of in conjunction with other
provisions of the Code that provide for allowances of state law
exemption.
Under the minority approach, § 548(a)(1) is read in
conjunction with the rest of the Code. Thus, § 544(b) and
§ 548(a)(1) produce similar outcomes. Just as § 544(b) bars a
creditor from seeking relief under state law which prohibits such
an action, the minority’s approach to § 548(a)(1) bars a creditor
from seeking relief by characterizing a debtor’s transfer as
fraudulent where state law provides an exemption to the debtor
for the property.174 Reading § 548(a)(1) as accounting for the
state law exemption provisions allowed under § 544(b) results in
a more coherent treatment of state law exemptions.175
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Reading § 548(a)(1) as allowing a debtor’s pre-petition
transfers of exempt property to be free from a trustee’s avoidance
action also coincides with § 522(b) of the Code. Section 522(b)
allows for an individual debtor to opt out of the federal
bankruptcy scheme and to elect to use applicable state law.176 It
therefore makes little sense to read an exclusively federalcontrolled exemption scheme into § 548(a)(1) when Congress
explicitly provided for states to have significant control in the
realm of exemptions as evidenced by its opt-out language.177 The
treatment of § 548(a)(1) under the Treiber approach with respect
to state exemption provisions logically coincides with the opt-out
language in § 522(b). If § 548(a)(1) is given a meaning that does
not account for § 522, it makes it unclear why the language of
§ 522 explicitly allows a debtor to elect to use applicable state
law, including state exemption laws.
B.

Policy Concerns and the Overarching Principles of
Bankruptcy Law

Two of bankruptcy law’s central policies or principles are
(1) to provide the debtor with a fresh start and (2) to distribute
the estate’s assets fairly among creditors.178
1.

A Debtor’s Fresh Start

176
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11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2012).
See id.
178
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (citing Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918)).
179
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
180
Stoltz v. Brattleboro Hous. Auth. (In re Stoltz), 315 F.3d 80, 94 (2d Cir.
2002).
177
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Bankruptcy law seeks to protect a debtor’s interests
following the completion of a bankruptcy proceeding. The
purpose of filing for bankruptcy is for the debtor to obtain “a new
opportunity in life . . . unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt.”179 Congress’s central
purpose in creating the Bankruptcy Code was to ensure this
fresh start for debtors, unburdened by preexisting debts.180
However, the Wickstrom approach does little to further this goal.

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 303 Side A

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_POMPEI

2015]

4/6/2016 4:11 PM

“NO HARM, STILL FOUL”

993

Exemption provisions, such as a homestead exemptions,
further the debtor’s ability to obtain a fresh start by protecting
some of the debtor’s property from the reach of creditors. Under
the Wickstrom approach, a debtor can be penalized for adhering
to state exemption provisions, which were put in place to protect
essential assets regardless of the bankruptcy. Courts following
the Wickstrom approach punish the debtor solely based on his
decision to make a transfer before filing for bankruptcy, instead
of waiting until he files.
Legislatures specifically enacted
exemption legislation to protect the debtor and his need for a
fresh start;181 the Wickstrom approach undermines this
legislation by allowing a trustee to avoid a debtor’s transfer of
exempt property where such transfer is allowed under state law.
In contrast to the Wickstrom approach, courts should
liberally interpret exemption statutes so that a debtor’s fresh
start is not impaired.182 By protecting a debtor’s transfer of
exempt property from creditors with no legal interest in the
property, the “no harm, no foul” approach under Treiber ensures
that the debtor maximizes its ability to have a fresh start at the
conclusion of the bankruptcy.183
2.

Creditors’ Rights to the Debtor’s Bankruptcy Estate
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181
See Sensenich v. Molleur (In re Chase), 2005 WL 189711, at *7 (Bankr. D. Vt.
Jan. 27, 2005) (noting that statutes which endanger the debtor’s homestead
exemption can jeopardize a debtor’s fresh start).
182
See, e.g., In re Brody, 297 B.R. 5, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
183
In contrast, the majority allows trustees with no legal interest in the exempt
property transferred by the debtor to create an interest simply due to the timing of
the transfer. See discussion supra Part II.A.
184
See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
185
Id.
186
In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 407 (2d. Cir. 1966).
187
See id. (“Bankruptcy does not provide a forum for the realignment of rights
or priorities . . . .”).
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Courts have a duty to ensure equal treatment of all creditors
in a bankruptcy proceeding.184 This duty includes obtaining a
“maximum and equitable distribution” for all creditors.185
However, bankruptcy proceedings provide a forum for the
recognition of already-acquired rights,186 which indicates that
bankruptcy proceedings do not create rights for creditors that
they did not have prior to the institution of the proceedings.187
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The Treiber approach to § 548 coincides with this principle of
the Bankruptcy Code, as well. Because the purpose of § 548(a)(1)
is to prevent a debtor from putting assets otherwise available to
creditors out of their reach,188 a proper reading of § 548(a)(1)
would only allow a trustee to avoid a debtor’s transfer of property
if the creditors had preexisting claims in the debtor’s property. If
the debtor’s property constituted exempt property under
applicable state law, creditors should not have a claim to the
property. The principles of bankruptcy law would not be
furthered by furnishing additional rights to the trustee.189
C.

The High Burden on a Transferee Limits Abuse of § 548(a)(1)

One of the main concerns regarding a debtor’s transfer of
exempt property prior to bankruptcy is that creditors will not
receive the full reimbursement they deserve.190 However, the
court in Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. v. Gredd explained how
this potential harm is adequately limited by the “no harm, no
foul” approach.191 In Gredd, the court stated that the transferee
carried the initial and final burden for proving that the creditor
was not harmed by the pre-petition transfer, and it set forth the
standard that must be met by the transferee to satisfy the court
that the creditor was not harmed by the transfer.192 The court
demanded:

188
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See Williams, supra note 169, at 63.
See id. at 128 (“In our quest to understand fraudulent transfer liability, we
often overlook its first principles. At its core, fraudulent transfer law is a debtcollection device and not a revenue-generating tool; its mission is to prevent the
unjust diminution of the debtor’s estate.”).
190
See, e.g., Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[C]reditors
can be harmed by transfers of potentially exempt property because it is not a
foregone conclusion that such property will be exempt from the estate.”).
191
See Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd, 275 B.R. 190, 196 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2003).
192
Id.
193
Id.
189
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[T]he transferee must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the
court that the transfer did not (1) reduce the res that would
have been available to any creditor or creditors, (2) “hinder,
delay, or defraud” any creditor or creditors, nor (3) have any
other adverse impact on any creditor or creditors generally.193
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The court noted that the trustee already bears a difficult
burden because she must prove that the transfer was made with
“actual intent” to defraud creditors.194 It therefore justified the
adoption of the diminution of estate approach by explaining that
the transferee had the ultimate duty to establish that the
creditor was not harmed by the transfer.195
Placing the burden of proof on the transferee, instead of the
trustee, adequately limits the risk of harm to the creditor that
courts following the Wickstrom approach often anticipate in their
decisions. The transferee cannot get away with such a transfer
without consequences. Instead, the transferee must show that
the assets were never available to any creditors and that the
creditor suffered no harm in a proceeding under § 548(a)(1)(A).196
CONCLUSION

194
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Id.
Id.
196
Id. The Gredd court referenced 5 Collier on Bankruptcy at 548–25, which
places the burden of showing “a harmless effect when the fraudulent intent is made
out” on the transferor-defendant, not the transferee. Id. However, regardless of
whether the burden is on the transferee or the defendant, the trustee will often
prevail due to this high burden by the opposing parties. See id. (“If [the trustee]
succeeds in demonstrating, which we expect will be rarely . . . .”). This will limit any
harm to the creditors, which is ultimately what the majority of courts is concerned
with.
197
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b)(1), 544(b)(1) (2012).
195
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The “no harm, no foul” approach as applied to § 548(a)(1),
which denies an avoidance remedy with respect to transfers of
otherwise exempt property, should trump the Wickstrom
approach. If a debtor transfers property prior to the initiation of
a bankruptcy proceeding, and that property is protected from the
reach of creditors under state exemption law, the creditor incurs
no harm and therefore should have no rights to that property.
This approach is supported by the plain language of § 548(a)(1)
and other relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the
overarching principles of bankruptcy law, and the already-high
burden on the transferee to prove that the transfer resulted in no
loss to the creditor. Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code has
clearly allowed for the application of state exemption provisions
Reading § 548(a)(1) in
in other parts of the statute.197
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conjunction with those provisions leads to the logical conclusion
that state exemption laws should dictate a trustee’s avoidance
power in fraudulent conveyance proceedings.
Lastly, an amendment to § 548(a)(1) to reflect the exclusion
of a debtor’s pre-petition transfer of exempt property from the
fraudulent conveyance definition198 would resolve the ambiguity
as to its meaning and thereby ensure a uniform judicial approach
to the transfer of exempt property. This solution would also
ensure that the Bankruptcy Code coincides with state preference
in the realm of exemption law, which is reflected by
overwhelming adoption of the UVTA by the states. Therefore, an
adoption of the “no harm, no foul” approach under Treiber as
reflected in a change to § 548(a)(1) would be the most effective
resolution to this conflict.
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Where applicable state law provides for such an exemption. See id. § 544(b).
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